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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996).
ISSUES P R E S E N T E D A N D STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue # 1: Was it proper for the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to Utah R.
Evid. 104 to determine the admissibility handwriting evidence, offered by Plaintiff to
challenge the validity of deeds that Plaintiff claimed were forged?
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. "Rule 611 gives a trial court broad
control over the mode and manner in which testimony is offered. Unless such discretion is
abused, we will affirm its exercise/' In re Estate of Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993).
Issue # 2: Did the trial court properly hold that the Acknowledgment Statute
precluded the admission of handwriting evidence, offered by Plaintiff to prove the forgery
of deeds, after the notaries who acknowledged the deeds gave credible testimony as to their
authenticity?
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Matters of statutory interpretation are
reviewed for correction of error. Green v. Turner, 4 P.3d 789, 791 (Utah 2000). Whether a
piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard.
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989)
Issue # 3: Did the trial court properly dismiss Appellant's case, keeping it from a
jury when it found, as a matter of law, that Appellant had not made out a prima facie case of
fraud?
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Standard of Review: Whether a party has established prima facie case is question of
law reviewed for correctness. Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,1144
(Utah Ct. App.1994); Handy v. Union Pac. KK Co., 841 P.2d 1210,1215 (Utah Ct. App.1992).
Issue # 4: Should Appellant be precluded from challenging the trial court's findings
on account of her failure to marshal all facts in the record that could support the trial court's
judgment?
Standard of Review: ffWe uphold a lower court's findings of fact unless the
evidence supporting them is so lacking that we must conclude the finding is 'clearly
erroneous.' " Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1244 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
Issue # 5: Even if the trial court erred in excluding Plaintiffs handwriting evidence,
can its ruling be affirmed as harmless error?
Standard of Review: Whether reasonable minds would have arrived at the same
result, regardless of the error. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d 330, 333
(1957).
RELEVANT STATUTORY A N D CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The following provisions of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Code, and the Utah
Rules of Evidence are provided in Addendum A to this brief:
Utah Const art. I, §§ 7,10, and 11
Acknowledgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 (2000)
Notaries Public Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 (1998 version and 2001
Supp.)
Utah R. Evid. 104(a)-(b), 402, and 611
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellees Cosby, Johnson, and United Security find Appellant's Statement of the
Case inadequate. A detailed summary of the factual background and the course of
proceedings below is therefore offered for clarification of the nature of the case and its
disposition. In addition, a chart summarizing the deeds that were challenged by Plaintiff,
their dates, the grantees, and the persons who notarized them can be found in Addendum B
to this brief.
I.

Factual Background

1.

On or about February 18,1999, Appellant filed a "Complaint and Demand

for a Jury Trial" (R. 1-27) in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. (R. 127)
2.

In her Complaint, Appellant Rosalind Cazares ("Cazares") alleged that

Defendants Robert Cosby and Annie L. Johnson ("Johnson") had participated in the
forgery of four deeds in order to defraud the estate of Rosemary Cosby ("Rosemary"). (R.
9-10)
3.

Robert Cosby is the widower of Rosemary, who died on or about January 4,

1997. ( R . a t 2 , f 4 )
4.

The Complaint asks the Court to quiet tide to the various properties,

described in the deeds, in the name of Cazares as Personal Representative of Rosemary's
estate. (R. 19-22)
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5.

The Complaint alleges fraud, conversion, and civil conspiracy and asks for

compensatory and punitive damages against Robert Cosby, Johnson, and United Security
Financial. (R. 19-22)
6.

The Complaint alleges that Rosemary's signature was forged on the following

deeds:
(a)

A quit claim deed filed November 7, 1994 in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office, for the purpose of recording the transfer of Rosemary's interest in the
marital residence (3188 Deer Hollow Drive in Sandy, Utah, hereinafter, the "Deer Hollow
Deed") to Rosemary and Robert Cosby, as tenants in common. (R. 24)
(b)

A quit claim deed filed February 11,1997 in the Salt Lake County-

Recorder's Office for the purpose of recording the transfer of Rosemary's condominium
property (Zion Summit Condominium Unit 905 B, hereinafter, the "Zion Condominium
Deed") to Rosemary and Robert Cosby, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. 25)
(c)

A quit claim deed filed March 4, 1997 in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office for the purpose of recording the transfer of Rosemary's interest in lot 260
of the Park Crest Subdivision (hereinafter, the "Park Crest Deed") to Rosemary and Robert
Cosby, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. 26)
(d)

A quit claim deed filed September 29,1998 in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office for the purpose of recording the transfer Rosemary's interest in Lot 49 of
the Westpointe Subdivision, Plat "B" (the "Westpointe Deed") to Annie L. Johnson. (R.
27)
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7.

The Deer Hollow Deed recites that it was signed by Rosemary on November

2,1994, and acknowledged before Linda Weir, an a u t h o r e d Utah notary, the same day. (R.
24)
8.

The Zion Condominium deed recites that it was signed by Rosemary and

acknowledged before Patricia Tunson, an authorized Utah notary, on December 16,1996.
(R.25)
9.

The Park Crest deed recites that it was signed by Rosemary and acknowledged

before Linda Weir on December 16,1996. (R. 26)
10.

The Westpointe deed recites that it is signed by Rosemary and acknowledged

before Linda Weir on March 25,1994.
11.

(R. 27)

On November 7,1994, a Deed of Trust was filed in the Salt Lake County

Recorder's Office, recording the grant of a beneficial interest in the Deer Hollow Property
to Defendant United Security Financial in exchange for a $420,000 loan to the Cosbys. (R.
333-4)
12.

The United Security Financial Deed of Trust recites that it was signed by the

Cosbys and acknowledged before Tarci D. Carlson, an authorized Utah notary on
November 2,1994. (R. 334)
13.

On August 23,1995, a second Deed of Trust was filed in the Salt Lake

County Recorder's Office, recording the grant of a beneficial interest in the Deer Hollow
Property to Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, in exchange for a $595,000 loan to the
Cosbys (the "Chase Manhattan Deed of Trust"). (R- 56-68)
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14.

The Chase Manhattan Deed of Trust recites that it was signed and

acknowledged before Tarci Eastburn, an authorized Utah notary, on August 18, 1995. (R.
61)
15.

On or about December 16,1996, a Deed of Trust was filed in the Salt Lake

County Recorder's Office recording the grant of a beneficial interest in the Zion
Condominium Property to United Security Financial in exchange for a loan of $105,000 (the
"2d U.S.R Deed of Trust"). (R. 340)
16.

The 2d U.S.F. Deed of Trust recites that it was signed and acknowledged

before Patricia Tunson. (R. 341)
17.

In her Complaint, Cazares claimed that Rosemary's signature was forged on

all the above-referenced deeds and Deeds of Trust (R. 10-19)
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case

1.

Plaintiff, in her Complaint, claimed that she had retained the services of an

expert handwriting analyst who had "opined that the purported signatures of Rosemary
Cosby, appearing on the Deer Hallow [sic], Zion Condominium, Park Crests [sic] and Libby
Way deeds, are not the actual signatures of Rosemary Cosby." (R. 10)
2.

In a memorandum opposing Defendants' various motions to dismiss the case

for failure to prosecute, Plaintiff offered, as an exhibit, a letter from George J.
Throckmorton, dated February 8,1999, offering his opinion that the signatures on the
deeds in question "appear to be simulated forgeries . . . . "
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(R. 208-9)

3.

On April 13, 2001, at a pretrial hearing, the trial court granted permission to J.

Bruce Reading, counsel for Defendants Cosby, United Security, and Johnson to file a
Motion in Limine by April 18. (R. 355)
4.

Mr. Reading filed the Motion in Limine to restrict testimony regarding the

disputed deeds and trust deeds to the notaries who acknowledged them, based upon Utah
Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14. (R. 378-9)
5.

Plaintiffs counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the statute was

inapplicable and appended unauthenticated medical records to his memorandum to prove
that Rosemary was not in Salt Lake City when the Chase Manhattan Trust Deed was
acknowledged on August 18, 1995. (R 397-399)
6.

However, the medical records were never authenticated, and the document

offered to prove that Rosemary was not in Salt Lake City does not indicate where the
described treatment was administered, or by whom. (R 397)
7.

After opposing and reply memoranda were filed, the trial court entered an

Order granting the Motion in Limine. (R. 433-4)
8.

By Order, the trial court found that expert testimony regarding the

handwriting of Rosemary Cosby was inadmissible unless the testimony of the notaries who
acknowledged the deeds in question was shown not credible by clear and convincing
evidence. (R. 434)
9.

The trial court gave Plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence that the

notaries were not credible at a hearing held on May 21, 2001. (R. 434, f 5)
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10.

At the May 21 hearing, Edward M. Garrett, counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,

offered into evidence a copy of the Zion Condominium Deed (marked Plaintiffs Exhibit 1),
and proffered evidence that the notary stamp used by Patricia Tunson on the deed was not
issued until after the death of the grantor, Rosemary Cosby. (R. 487 pp. 12-13)
11.

During direct examination by counsel for Defendant, Ms. Tunson testified

that she had called Rosemary Cosby in Florida on December 16, 1996, at which time
Rosemary had directed Tunson to notarise the Zion Condominium Deed. (R. 486, pp. 5-6)
12.

Ms. Tunson testified that she had known Rosemary Cosby for about thirty

five years (R. 486, pg. 3), and that she had described the substance of the deed to Rosemary
before acknowledging it. (R. 486, pg. 6, lines 12-20)
13.

Ms. Tunson testified that although she signed her acknowledgment of the

Zion Condominium Deed on December 16,1996, she inadvertently failed to affix her seal
to the deed because she had "set it aside and proceeded to talk to [Rosemary]." (R. 486, pg.
6, line 24 to pg. 7, line 4)
14.

Ms. Tunson testified that she did not affix her seal until late January 1997,

after she had received her new commission and new stamp.

(R. 486, pg. 7, lines 16-21 and

Pg- 14)
15.

Ms. Tunson also testified that the December 16, Zion Condominium Deed

was part of a loan package, and its purpose was to lower the interest rate on the property.
(R. 486, pg. 16, lines 13-16)
16.

At the May 21 hearing, counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant also offered into

evidence copies of the Park Crest, Westpointe, and the Deer Hollow Deeds (marked
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Plaintiffs Exhibits 4,5 and 6) all of which bear the notary stamp of Linda Weir. (R. 487 at
pp. 16-17)
17.

The Park Crest, Westpointe, and the Deer Hollow Deeds were offered and

received into evidence for the purpose of showing that some or all of them were not
actually notarized by Ms. Weir, even though her stamp had been used. (R. 487, pp. 19, lines
21-23 and pg. 20, lines 13-23)
18.

On direct examination by counsel for Defendant, Ms. Weir testified that she

recognized her own signature on the Park Crest, Westpointe and Deer Hollow Deeds. (R.
486, pg. 19, beginning line 10, through pg. 20, line 8)
19.

When asked why the signatures were different, she testified that "I sign my

name different ways, depending on how I feel. When Pm rushing, I sign it like Exhibit 5,
but I do know my signature, and all three of these are my signature." (R. 486, pg. 20, lines
10-12)
20.

When asked, on cross examination, whether Rosemary Cosby had appeared

before Ms. Weir on August 16,1996, the date of the Park Crest Deed, Ms. Weir testified
that "[e]ither she appeared before me or she acknowledged to me that it was her signature."
(R. 486, pg. 21, lines 12-13)
21.

Counsel for Plaintiff also introduced into evidence a quit claim deed notarized

by Janet Martin on November 27,1989 (R. 330), (the "Coates and Corum's Deed," marked
as Plaintiffs Exhibit 7), conveying Rosemary's interest in the described property to the Faith
Temple Pentecostal Church. (R. 487, pg. 21, line 19, through pg. 22, line 10)
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22.

Although counsel for Plaintiff proffered that he had a witness available to

testify that Rosemary Cosby was not in Salt Lake City when the Coates and Corum's Deed
was signed, counsel did not call the witness. (R. 487, pg. 21, line 19, through pg. 22, line 10)
23.

Believing that he had been precluded from introducing not only expert

testimony calling into question the authenticity of Rosemary's handwriting on the deeds, but
lay testimony as well, counsel for Plaintiff summari2ed all handwriting evidence by proffer.
(R. 487, pg. 23, lines 13-16)
24.

In this belief, counsel for Plaintiff was mistaken, as the trial court's Order

only precluded expert handwriting testimony unless it could be shown that the notaries who
acknowledged the disputed deeds were not credible. (R. 433-5)
25.

Plaintiffs counsel summamed evidence he claimed he could present at trial as

follows:
a.

A letter from Fran Fish of the Department of Commerce regarding the

inability of a notary to obtain a stamp until a commission is issued (for the purpose of
showing Patricia Tunson did not have the seal used on the Zion Condominium Deed at the
time the deed was signed.) (R. 487 pg. 24)
b.

A video tape of Defendant Johnson claiming that she is signing the

signatures of Robert and Rosemary Cosby. (R. 487 pg. 24) (Objection as to relevancy
sustained. (R. 487 pg. 27))
c.

A package of Chase Manhattan Trust Deeds and related documents

reciting execution in Utah in August of 1995 when, according to Plaintiff, Rosemary was
absent from Utah. (R. 487 pp. 28-29) See also Plaintiffs Response to Motion in Limine, (R.
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394) Trust Deed package not received on grounds that notary nevertheless took attestation
either in person or over the telephone, as shown by affidavit in the record (R.487 at pg. 30)
and Affidavit of Tarci Eastburn. (R. 416-417).
d.

Expert handwriting testimony of George Throckmorton to the effect

that Rosemary Cosby's signatures on the deeds are forged. (R. 487, pg. 32)
e.

Testimony of Plaintiff Cazares and Adrian Jefferson (Rosemary's

grandson) that Rosemary was not in Utah on the dates that the Zion Condominium (12-1696) and Coates and Corum's (11-27-89) Deeds were signed. (R. 487, pg. 33)
f.

Testimony of Plaintiff Cazares and one "Mrs. Morris," allegedly

familiar with Rosemary's signature, that the signatures on the challenged deeds are not
Rosemary's signature. (R. 487, pg. 33)
26.

At the conclusion of the May 21, hearing, the trial court ruled that the

evidence both presented and proffered by Plaintiff did not provide an adequate basis for
Plaintiff to proceed to trial because the quantum of evidence proffered could not meet the
clear and convincing standard required to challenge the deeds. (R. 487, pg. 68)
27.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated June 28, 2001, the trial

court held that the facts presented at the May 21 hearing did not meet the burden of clear
and convincing evidence "that any of the notary's public attestation [sic] lack credibility."
(R. 464, H 3)
28.

The trial court held that Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14, and 57-4A-4

afforded recorded documents a presumption of validity that could not be rebutted by
Plaintiffs evidence. (R. 464, U 2 and R. 465, f 5)
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29.

The trial Court therefore dismissed Plaintiffs case as no cause of action. (R.

465)
SUMMARY O F T H E A R G U M E N T S

1.

The May 21, 2001 Utah R. Evid. 104 hearing below was held for the purpose

of determining whether handwriting recognition evidence was admissible to prove the
forgery of the deeds challenged by Plaintiff/Appellant Cazares. Under Rule 104(a), the trial
court has a duty to exclude evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of legal policy. The trial
court properly excluded Plaintiffs handwriting evidence under Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10,
11, and 14, which reflect the legislature's intent to give acknowledged documents a
presumption of validity that cannot be overcome by handwriting evidence alone when a
notary or other witness is available to testify as to the validity of the document.
Furthermore, under Utah R. Evid. 104(b), the trial court could have found that the
handwriting evidence was only conditionally relevant. In other words, such evidence would
only be relevant if Rosemary Cosby had not instructed the notaries to acknowledge the
deeds. Because the evidence showed that Rosemary adopted the signatures (whether hers
or not) by authorizing the acknowledgments, the handwriting evidence was irrelevant to
prove fraud or conspiracy as alleged in the Complaint.
2.

The trial court properly held that Utah's Acknowledgment Statute, Utah Code

Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 (1999), prohibits a challenge to acknowledged deeds by handwriting
evidence alone. The statute provides that a deed that has been acknowledged and proved by
subscribing witnesses cannot be challenged based on handwriting evidence unless the
subscribing witnesses are dead or unavailable. Although the statute dates back to a time
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when deeds could not be recorded without a "certificate of proof' by subscribing
witnesses, the policy of the statute is sound and should be relevant today. Because notaries
are the modern equivalent of subscribing witnesses, their testimony should be primary.
Only if their testimony can be impeached by cross examination or by extrinsic evidence,
should handwriting evidence be permitted to challenge the validity of a deed. Without such
a policy, any interested party could challenge the validity of a deed and take his case to trial
merely by claiming familiarity with the grantor's signature. Entitling such parties to a jury
trial on handwriting evidence alone would threaten the integrity of Utah's recording system
and encourage frivolous lawsuits.
3.

Appellant's constitutional arguments are inadequate under Utah R. App. P.

24. She has not provided a meaningful analysis of the alleged violations of Utah's due
process, open courts, or jury trial clauses, and her arguments should therefore not be
considered. Nevertheless, Appellant arguments fail on the merits. First, there was no
violation of her right to a jury trial because the case was decided as a matter of law. Second,
there was no due process violation because motions were submitted according to Utah R.
Judic. Admin. 4-501, and Plaintiff had adequate notice of all hearings. Finally, the court was
open to Plaintiff for over two years, during which she failed to find any substantial evidence
to support her claims.
4.

Appellant has failed to marshal all the evidence in the record which could

support the trial court's findings of fact, as is required to challenge such findings under Utah
law. This Court should therefore assume that the record supports the trial court's findings
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of fact, and review for accuracy the lower court's conclusions of law as applied to those
facts.
5.

Even if the trial court erred as a matter of law in excluding Appellant's

handwriting recognition witnesses, such error should not be reversed unless there is a
reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different without the error. Here,
it was plain that even if Appellant had been permitted to put all her evidence before a jury, it
would not have been sufficient to fulfill the clear and convincing burden necessary to
challenge the validity of the deeds.
ARGUMENT

L

The Trial Court's Decision to Hold a Rule 104 Hearing to Determine
the Admissibility of Appellant's Handwriting Evidence Was Proper
under the Rules of Evidence,

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding a Rule 104 evidentiary hearing
to determine the admissibility of testimony by Appellant's expert handwriting witness.
Appellant correctly observes that the Rule requires the trial court to resolve preliminary
questions concerning the qualifications of a witness. However, the Rule also requires the
trial court to determine "[preliminary questions concerning the . . . admissibility of the
evidence . . . . " Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (2001).
In this instance, the trial court was not called upon to determine the qualifications of
the witness, whose credentials were not disputed. Rather, the trial court was called upon to
determine whether, in light of a legal policy that affords a strong presumption of validity to
acknowledged deeds, any handwriting evidence was admissible under the facts of the case.
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See Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952) (holding that
validity of acknowledged deeds can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence).
A.

Utah Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 402 Require the Court to
Determine Preliminary Questions Regarding the Admissibility of
the Evidence Under Applicable Statutes and Court Rules.

It was proper for the judge to hold a hearing without a jury to determine whether
Appellant's handwriting evidence was admissible under Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-10 through
§ 57-2-17 (2000). Rule 104(a) makes questions of admissibility under the rules of evidence
the province of the trial judge. Such questions "shall be determined by the court [.]" See
Utah R. Evid. 104(a). The rule requires a judge to exclude evidence that, although logically
relevant, is nevertheless prohibited due to policies embodied in evidentiary rules. See, e.g.
Utah R. Evid. 802 (generally excluding hearsay) and Utah R. Evid. 403 (excluding overly
prejudicial evidence), for example, are rules that embody such policies.
In addition, statutory provisions must be considered by a trial court in determining
the admissibility of evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 402 (providing that all relevant evidence is
generally admissible except as provided by statute, constitution, or court rule). While the
handwriting testimony proffered by Plaintiff below had logical relevance as to the question
of forgery, the trial judge properly considered that relevance in light of the Acknowledgment
Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 - 17 (2000), which specifically limits the admissibility of
handwriting evidence whenever a notari2ed deed is challenged. Section 10 of the statute
provides that proof of the execution of a deed must be, in the first instance, by subscribing
witnesses. Only in the event that such witnesses are dead or unavailable may evidence of
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handwriting be introduced. Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-14 expresses the requirement most
succinctly:
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the
subscribing witness or witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer
taking the same shall be satisfied that all the subscribing witnesses to
such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had to
prove the execution thereof.
At the Rule 104 hearing, the trial judge heard the testimony of the notaries1 who had
acknowledged four of the five challenged deeds that had been admitted into evidence.
(Janet Martin, who notari2ed the Coates & Corum's Deed, did not testify at the hearing
because, according to Defendant's counsel, she was in Indianapolis. See R. 487, pg. 37.)
Notary Patricia Tunson testified that she had notarized the Zion Condominium Deed
according to Rosemary Cosby's instructions. See R. 486, pp. 5-6. Linda Weir testified that
her own signature appeared on the Park Crest, the Westpointe, and the Deer Hollow Deeds.
(R. 486, pp. 19-21) Both notaries testified that Rosemary was either personally present or
on the telephone with them at the time of the acknowledgments. See R. 486, pp. 5-6 and R.
at 486, pp. 19-21. In particular, Ms. Tunson, who had a thirty five year friendship with
Rosemary, testified that the Zion Condominium Deed was granted as part of a loan package
to reduce the interest rate on the property. See R. 486 at pg. 16. Further, Ms. Tunson
testified that she had explained the nature of the Zion Condominium Deed to Rosemary
before acknowledging it. See id. at pp. 5-6.

[

See Point II infra, arguing that notaries are the modern equivalent of "subscribing
witnesses" under the Acknowledgment Statute.
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With regard to the notari2ation of the 1989 Coates and Corum's Deed, Plaintiff
proffered testimony that Rosemary Cosby was living in Indiana at the time of execution (R.
487, pg. 33) and Defendant proffered testimony that the property was conveyed to the Faith
Pentecostal Church at that time for tax purposes because the property is the site of the
church commissary (R. 487, pg. 36).
The trial judge properly found the testimony of the notaries was credible, and that
Title 57, Chapter 2 of the Utah Code therefore did not permit rebuttal by handwriting
evidence. (R. 487, pg. 56) "A determination under 104(a) . . . calls for the exercise of
judicial fact-finding responsibilities by the trial judge, responsibilities which require him to
evaluate both credibility and the weight of the evidence." United States v. Enrigbt, 579 F.2d
980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding trial court's admission of a co-conspirator's statement
under Fed. R. Evid. 802(d)(2)(E) upon prima facie showing that conspiracy existed was not
plain error).
The trial judge's responsibilities under Rule 104(a) are often best carried out in the
context of a pre-trial hearing where the parties can present their arguments without danger
of the jury hearing evidence that is later found to be inadmissible. Moreover, Utah R. Evid.
611 gives trial courts control over the mode and order of judicial proceedings. The trial
court therefore had absolute discretion to hold a 104(a) hearing to determine the
admissibility of Plaintiff s handwriting evidence. Its decision to hold the May 21, 2001
hearing should not be disturbed on appeal.
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B.

In the Alternative, the Court's Exclusion of Plaintiffs
Handwriting Evidence Could Be Affirmed under Utah R. Evid.
104(b) Because It Was Not Relevant In Light of Credible
Evidence That Rosemary Acknowledged the Deeds.

The trial court's decision to exclude handwriting evidence could also be affirmed
under Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 104(b), when the relevance
of evidence depends on the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court may hold a hearing
and require the proponent to come forward with sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
the condition exists. See Utah R. Evid. 104(b). If that condition does not exist, the
proponent's evidence is not relevant and thus not admissible. See United States v. Enright,
579 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978) (reviewing trial court's evidentiary hearing to determine
sufficiency of evidence to support preliminary fact that a conspiracy existed, without which
proponent's evidence in form of hearsay statements would not be relevant); see also
McCormick on Evidence § 53, 4th Ed. (West 1992) (explaining that the judge may require
the proponent of the evidence to come forward with sufficient evidence from which the
jury could find the existence of the preliminary fact upon which the relevance of the
evidence is conditioned before allowing the admission of evidence supporting that
preliminary fact).
In the hearing below, evidence tending to show that the handwriting on the deeds
was not Rosemary Cosby's was only conditionally relevant. This is because a party may
adopt a signature written for him by another on a deed by acknowledging the signature. See
Rowray v. Caper Mut. Building &LoanAss%

45 P.2d 7 (Wyoming 1935) (affirming trial court's

finding that wife had adopted signature on deed as her own by acknowledging it even
though husband had signed her name for her); see also 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 26 (1994)
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.(acknowledgment of deed by grantor will render it a valid conveyance even though another
has signed the deed for him).
Thus, the evidence tending to show that the signatures were not in Rosemary's hand
was only relevant if it could be shown that Rosemary had not acknowledged the signatures.
In light of the notaries' credible testimony at the Rule 104 hearing to the effect that
Rosemary had personally instructed them to acknowledge the deeds, Appellant's
handwriting evidence was not relevant to prove that the deeds were a product of fraud or
civil conspiracy, as alleged in the Complaint. Because Rosemary either signed the deeds
herself or adopted the signatures that appeared on them by acknowledgment, the deeds
were valid regardless of any evidence that tended to prove that the signatures were not in
her handwriting. The trial court's exclusion of Appellant's expert handwriting evidence
was therefore proper and should be affirmed.
II.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF H A N D W R I T I N G E V I D E N C E
PROPERLY FOSTERED UTAH'S POLICY OF AFFORDING A STRONG
PRESUMPTION OF AUTHENTICITY T O ACKNOWLEDGED D E E D S .

The trial court properly excluded Appellant's expert handwriting witness in light of
policies embodied in Utah law. Utah courts have long afforded acknowledged and recorded
deeds presumptive validity, and have held that this presumption can only be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence. See Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank <& Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692,
694 (Utah 1952). Utah law further recognizes that evidence of handwriting is merely
secondary evidence and should not ordinarily be offered when a person who witnessed the
signing of a deed is available to testify. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 14 (2001)
(providing that a deed duly acknowledged and proved by subscribing witnesses cannot be
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challenged based on handwriting evidence unless the subscribing witnesses are dead or
unavailable).
A.

Because it Has Not Been Repealed. The Acknowledgment
Statute's Policy Should Be Read Into The Modem Recording
Statute.

Utah's Acknowledgment Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-2-10 - 17, dates back to a
time when a deed could not be recorded unless it was both notarized and subscribed to by
witnesses. See Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 14 P. 338 (Utah Terr. 1887) (holding that a deed must
be both acknowledged and witnessed or it cannot be admitted into evidence to challenge
the tide of a stranger to the deed). Today, acknowledgment of the grantor's signature, by
itself, is sufficient to permit a deed to be recorded. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-101 (2001)
and Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Utah App. 1991).
Because the Acknowledgment statute has not been repealed, the modern Notaries
Public Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 etseq., must be deemed to incorporate its
policy. In Murray City v. Hall, the Utah Supreme Court endorsed the following principle of
statutory construction:
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that whenever the
legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held that in
the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the
new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be
construed together.
663 P.2d 1314,1318 (Utah 1983) (citing 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §
51.02 (4th ed. 1973)). Appellant therefore errs in arguing that the Acknowledgment Statute
has no applicability merely because there were no subscribing witnesses to the deeds
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challenged below. This position would render the statute meaningless merely because of its
antiquity, and abrogate the salutary policy it represents. Although there were apparentiy no
witnesses to Rosemary's signature apart from the notaries, the policy of the
Acknowledgment Statute should nevertheless apply.
While a notary is not required to witness the signing of documents, the notary is the
closest modern equivalent of a subscribing witness. A notary serves essentially the same
function, which is to ensure that someone other than the signer can testify from first hand
knowledge as to the authenticity of a signature. If the notary follows the statutory
procedures, and there is no reason, extrinsic to the document, to suspect fraud or forgery, a
deed should be presumptively valid. A challenge by handwriting evidence alone, absent
other reason for suspicion, would never be sufficient to rebut reliable, primary testimony by
a notary. Such second-hand evidence should be afforded little or no weight in comparison
to the notary's testimony. The notary's testimony could take the form of an actual memory
of the circumstances of acknowledgment or testimony as to the notary's habit of routinely
following the statutorily required procedures.
That mere handwriting evidence by itself would carry little weight in comparison to a
notary's testimony is borne out under the facts and circumstances below. For example, Ms.
Tunson had had a personal relationship with Rosemary Cosby for thirty five years at the
time she notarized the Zion Condominium Deed. (R. 486, pg. 3) She understood that
Rosemary was acknowledging the deed so that she could get a lower interest rate on her
mortgage. (R. 486, pg. 16) Further, she identified the deed and explained its effect to
Rosemary before notarizing it. (R. 486, pg. 6) The other deeds were challenged only on the
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basis of discrepancies in notary Linda Weir's signature and her inability to remember
whether Rosemary was personally present on any particular occasion when a given deed was
acknowledged. (R. 486, pp. 21-23) However, Ms. Weir testified that she was familiar with
her own signature, and that it appeared upon all the deeds challenged by Plaintiff. (R. 486,
pp. 18-20) She explained that her signature took two forms depending upon the
circumstances: initials if she was in a hurry and her full name if she was not. (R. 486, pg. 20)
The Acknowledgment Statute wisely prohibits opening statutorily valid deeds to
challenge based merely on handwriting evidence when a notary is available to testify from
personal experience that the signature was duly acknowledged. Without such a policy, any
interested party (as, for example, and as the present case, the potential heir of a grantor)
could attempt to challenge the validity of a deed merely by claiming familiarity with the
grantor's signature and contesting the deed's authenticity solely on that ground. Such a
party would then be entitied to go to trial based upon an allegation of forgery despite a
notary's reliable testimony to the contrary that he or she took the grantor's
acknowledgment. Judicial resources would be wasted, and juries would be unnecessarily
empaneled, all at significant expense of time, effort, and money at the insistence of anyone
dissatisfied with his share in a deceased relative's estate.
B*'

Appellant Has Mischaracterized the Trial Court's Order and the
Northcrest Case,

Appellant has attempted to persuade the Court on appeal by distorting the facts.
Neither the trial court's Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine nor the Northcrest case are
adequately described in Appellant's brief.
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1.

The Trial Court's Order

Appellant has mischaracterized the trial court's position on the Acknowledgment
Statute. The trial court did not hold that "a notary stamp is conclusive evidence and the
only evidence that a Court can entertain on the subject of authenticity." See Appellant's
Brief at 12. Nor did the trial court state that the Acknowledgment Statute provides that "a
notary is the only person who can testify concerning the authenticity of a signature." See id.
Instead, the trial court held that handwriting evidence is only admissible if the challenging
party can show, "by clear and convincing evidence that the notary public whose testimony is
to be heard by the Court is not credible." (R. 434, ^f 5) Thus, if fraud or forgery could be
shown by evidence extrinsic of the deed, handwriting evidence could be admitted. For
example, if someone could testify that he saw the notary sign an acknowledgment on a deed
pursuant to instructions by a person other than the grantor, the handwriting evidence would
be admissible to bolster that testimony. Or perhaps a witness could testify that he had seen
someone forging the deed and handing it to the notary, who then signed and stamped it.
Even if a witness could credibly testify that he was privy to a conspiracy to convert the
property by forgery, the deed could be challenged by handwriting evidence. In such
circumstances, handwriting evidence could be admitted as secondary evidence to support
testimony based upon personal knowledge.
In the trial court below, however, Plaintiff offered no witnesses with personal
knowledge of any fact, apart from claims of signature recognition, that would provide direct
evidence of fraud or forgery. At best, Plaintiff proffered testimony by interested parties that
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Rosemary was not in Utah when the Coates and Corum's Deed and the Zion Condominium
deeds were signed in 1989 and 1996. (R. 487, pg. 33)
2.

The Northcrest Case.

Appellant contends that Northcrest is dispositive of this case. Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker
Bank <& Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 1952). However, the Court should consider several
important distinguishing facts of Northcrest. In Northcrest, the notary executed the
acknowledgment merely because "she 'thought' it looked like [grantor's] signature."
Northcrest, 248 P.2d at 694. There was no suggestion that the notary even so much as
discussed the deed with the grantor at any time. Moreover, in Northcrest, the plaintiff
conceded that the signature on the deed was not in the handwriting of the purported
grantor. See id.
In the case on appeal, Defendants have never conceded that the signatures appearing
on the deeds in question are not Rosemary's signature. Rosemary discussed the Zion
Condominium Deed extensively with Patricia Tunson, the notary, before Ms. Tunson
notarized it. (R. 486, pp. 5-6) Rosemary knew that the purpose of the deed was to lower
the interest rate on her mortgage (R. 486, pg. 16) and discussed this with Ms. Tunson,
whom she had known for thirty five years (R. 486, pg. 3). Therefore, Rosemary either
signed the deed herself or adopted the signature on the deed.
Further, in Northcrest, there was convincing evidence that the grantor was not
anywhere near Salt Lake City at the time of the signing of the deed. In the case on appeal,
only two deeds were so challenged by evidence actually admitted by the trial court (as
opposed to evidence by proffer). First, Plaintiff offered some unauthenticated medical
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records in support of her contention that Rosemary was in Florida when the Chase
Manhattan Deed of Trust was signed (8-18-95).

See Exhibits attached to Plaintiffs

Response to Motion in Limine (R. 397-398). Second, Patricia Tunson admitted, in her
testimony at the May 21, 2001 hearing, that Rosemary was in Florida at the time of the
notari2ation of the December 16,1996 Zion Condominium Deed. (R. 486, pg. 5)
Neither the medical transcripts nor the testimony of Ms. Tunson, however, were
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of validity afforded to acknowledged deeds.
The unauthenticated medical records were only relevant to the Chase Manhattan Deed of
Trust, and were unconvincing due to lack of authentication and the absence of any
indication in the documents as to where the August 18,1995 medical treatment was
administered. (R. 397) With regard to Ms. Tunson's testimony, the facts and circumstances
she related regarding the notaiization of the Zion Condominium Deed tend to give it
adequate indicia of statutory validity, as will be discussed in part C, infra.
C.

The Irregularities in the Notaries* Procedures Were Insufficient
to Overcome the Credibility of Their Testimony or to Invalidate
the Deeds

Appellant has made much ado over Ms. Eastburn's admission that she sometimes
took Rosemary's acknowledgments over the telephone, and Ms. Weir's admission that she
either notarized the August 16,1996 Park Crest Deed over the telephone or in Rosemary's
presence, but could not remember precisely how she had performed the notari2ation on
that occasion. However, the fact that a notary has on certain occasions taken
acknowledgments without requiring the presence of the signer is not direct evidence that the
notary took the acknowledgments in this manner on the particular occasion in question. See
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Credit Bureau of Preston v. KS Sleight, 440 P.2d 143, 149 (Idaho 1968) (citing First Nat'lBank of
Pocatello v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 232 P.899 (1925)).
In the trial court below, Tarci Eastburn and Linda Weir admitted that they
sometimes took Rosemary's acknowledgment outside her presence. See Affidavit of Tarci
Eastburn, (R. 417) (admitting that she sometimes notari2ed Rosemary's documents outside
her presence, but not recalling the circumstances of the Deer Hollow Trust Deed
documents); see also Testimony of Linda Weir, (R. 486, pg. 21, lines 12-13) (testifying that
Rosemary, on all occasions, either appeared before her or otherwise acknowledged her
signature). However, neither Ms. Eastburn nor Ms. Weir could say that, on any particular
occasion in question, that they had failed to require Rosemary's presence before notarizing
the particular deeds or trust deeds challenged by Plaintiff. Without any direct evidence that
the notaries had failed to require Rosemary's presence on the those particular deeds, their
testimony was insufficient to impeach the validity of the acknowledgments, which under
Utah law must be by clear and convincing evidence. Northcrest, 248 P.2d at 694.
Patricia Tunson did, however, testify that the Deer Hollow Deed was notarized while
Ms. Tunson spoke to Rosemary over the telephone. (R. 486, pg. 5) This would raise a
question as to whether the statutory requirement of the signer's "presence" had been
fulfilled. By statute, a notary must "certify that the signer . . . has admitted, in the notary's
presence, having signed a document voluntarily for its stated purpose." See Utah Code Ann.
§46-1-2(1) (1998).
"Presence" is not defined by the statute. See id. However, Patricia Tunson's
telephone conversation was an electronic communication that was as reliable as a
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communication taken in the physical presence of the notary.2 Patricia Tunson had known
Rosemary Cosby for thirty five years. (R. 486, pg. 3) After explaining the nature of the
Zion Condominium deed to Rosemary, Rosemary a u t h o r e d her to notarize it (R. 486, pg.
6) The deed was for the purpose of lowering the interest rate on Rosemary's mortgage on
the Zion Condominium Property. (R. 486, pg. 16) Given that Ms. Tunson had initiated the
call herself, that she was thoroughly familiar with Rosemary, and that she had discussed
personal subjects not related to the deeds with Rosemary before acknowledging Rosemary's
signature, there is no question that Ms. Tunson was, for all practical purposes, in
Rosemary's "presence." Certainly, Rosemary's physical presence, under these particular
facts, would have added nothing to Rosemary's acknowledgment that the deed had been
signed "voluntarily for its stated purpose" as required by the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §
46-1-2(1) (1998). In light of these particular circumstances, the Zion Condominium Deed
should be immune from challenge on appeal.

2

It should be of no small interest to the Court that a "presence" by means of
authorized electronic communication is sufficient under the 1999 amendment to the statute,
which reads:
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a
signer, whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the
basis of satisfactory evidence, has admitted, and which admission is made
either in the presence of the notary or by an electronic
communication
that is as reliable as an admission made in the presence of the notary^
provided that the electronic communication is authorized by law or rule,
signing a document voluntarily for its stated purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-2 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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HI.

BECAUSE T H E TRIAL JUDGE DISPOSED OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE AS A
M A T T E R OF LAW. T H E R E WAS N O CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
BELOW.

.

Appellant contends that, in the course of the proceedings below, her right to a jury
trial under Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution was violated, and that she was also
denied due process and due remedy under Article I, §§ 7 and 11. Appellant's entire
argument consists of quotes from the Utah Constitution and two short paragraphs that, in
essence, claim that the trial court erred in dismissing her case for failure to present a prima
facie case prior to trial. No meaningful legal analysis of how the constitution prohibits such
a practice has been presented.
Appellant has inadequately briefed her constitutional arguments. When the overall
analysis of an issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court, the reviewing court should decline to consider that issue. State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998); Smith v. Smith, 995 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), cert, denied, 4
P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). While Appellees believe that Appellant's argument is not in
compliance with the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) and that her constitutional
arguments should therefore not be considered, they nevertheless addresses Appellant's
constitutional issues as follows.
A.

Because the Court Found that the Evidentiary Hearing Was
Dispositive of the Entire Case as a Matter of Lawy There Was N o
Violation of the Right to Trial By Jury.

Appellant complains that she was required to prove a prima facie case to the judge
before being allowed to take her case to a jury. See Appellant's Brief at pg. 20. The right to
a jury trial in civil cases is, of course, guaranteed by Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution.
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See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor <& Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421
(Utah 1981). However, this right is not absolute. Utah courts have long held that when a
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case before the trial, the case should not be submitted
to a jury. See Gregory v. Denver <& Rio Grande Western KK Co., 329 P.2d 407, 408 (Utah 1958).
Moreover, decisions can be taken from the jury by a summary judgment motion under Utah
R. Civ. P. 56 or by a directed verdict under Utah R. Civ. P. 50.
It is not unconstitutional for a court to exclude a jury from deciding questions of law.
Such exclusion is the standard practice. SeeAMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of
America, 942 P.2d 315, 319-20 (Utah 1997) (holding that application of law to facts should
be resolved by trial court unless reasonable persons could differ about facts based on the
evidence). Preferably, disputed issues of law should be recognized and ruled upon before
trial. See DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Co., 442 P.2d 468 (Utah 1968) (finding that Utah R.
Civ. P. 16(a) contemplates pre-trial rulings on issues of law); Ramsey v. Salt hake City, 400
P.2d 205 (1965) (finding that dispositive pretrial order made presentation of issue to jury
mere surplusage). It is thus axiomatic that there is no perse right to a jury trial when a party
would lose his case as a matter of law.
The trial court below held that Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10,14, and 57-4A-4
precluded evidence of handwriting unless the notaries who acknowledged the deeds were
unavailable or their testimony was not credible. See Order (R 434, % 4). The notaries were
available, testified at the May 21, 2000 hearing, and their testimony was found to be credible.
Plaintiffs handwriting evidence was therefore excluded. Once this was decided, Plaintiff
had no witnesses with convincing evidence to challenge the authenticity of Rosemary's
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signature on the challenged deeds. The insubstantial quantum of remaining evidence
favoring Plaintiffs fraud and conspiracy theories did not warrant taking the case to a jury.
Accordingly, the Court properly dismissed this case sua sponte.
B.

There Was N o Due Process Violation Because the Issues Were
Fully Briefed By the Parties in Advance of the Evidentiary
Hearing.

To satisfy due process, "a hearing 'must be prefaced by timely notice which
adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet.'" In re
Worthen, 926 R2d 853 (Utah 1996) (citingNelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1211 (1983)
(recognizing that ambiguous or misleading notice may constitute a violation of due
process)).
Because the issues were fully briefed by the parties in this case before the May 21,
2001 hearing on Defendant's Motion in Limine below, there is no question that Plaintiff
was fully aware of the issues to be addressed, and that she had adequate notice. Memoranda
were submitted in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
Defendant filed the motion on or about April 18, 2001, arguing that under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 57-2-10 and 14, no proof of handwriting was admissible to prove that the deeds in this
case were forged unless the notaries who acknowledged them were unavailable. (R. 381384) Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's Motion in Limine on or about May 1, 2001
(R. 391-399), and a Reply Motion was timely filed in advance of the May 21 hearing (R. 408412). After direct and cross examination of notaries Patricia Tunson and Linda Weir, the
trial court dismissed Plaintiffs case because it found Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10, 57-2-14,
and 57-4A-4 precluded proof of handwriting absent a showing that the notaries were
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unavailable or that their testimony was not credible. (R. 487, pp. 67-68) Because
substantially all of Plaintiff s evidence of forgery consisted of handwriting recognition
evidence by both expert and lay witnesses, it was clear that Plaintiff did not have a case to
present to a jury, and her case was dismissed. Plaintiff cannot show that she was not
afforded due process in the proceedings below.
C.

Plaintiff Has Had Her Day in Court, and Thus There Is N o
Open Courts Violation

Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Appellant has failed to specify how this section applies to the case at bar. Utah
courts have essentially interpreted Art. I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution to prohibit the
legislature from enacting statutes that abrogate an existing legal remedy while failing to
provide an alternative remedy or to eliminate a clear social or economic evil. See Ross v.
Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). The bulk of Utah case law involving this section has
considered questions of governmental and tort immunity, statutes of repose, and damage
caps. See, e.g., Day v. State ex re/. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999)
(finding section of Governmental Immunity Act violative of Art. I, § 11); Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) (finding architects and builders statute of
repose violative of the provision); Lyon v. burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (finding damage
caps not violative of the provision).
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Plaintiff errs if she means to say that the portions of the Acknowledgment Statute
upon which the trial judge relied were constitutionally defective. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10
and 14 do not abrogate any specific cause of action. These statutory provisions merely limit
the type of evidence the trial judge may consider when the validity of an acknowledged deed
is challenged and a subscribing witness is available to testify.
Moreover, Plaintiff was given access to the trial court. Plaintiff filed the instant
action on or about February 18,1999. (R. 1-27) After numerous motions and hearings (one
of which has been memorialized in a sixty-nine page transcript found at R. 487), the trial
court decided the case as a matter of law after considering the arguments of the parties.
Plaintiff was therefore given ample opportunity to pursue her claims in the trial court below.
IV.

BECAUSE APPELLANT H A S FAILED T O MARSHAL A L L FACTS I N SUPPORT
OF T H E J U D G M E N T . H E R CHALLENGE T O T H E TRIAL COURT'S
F I N D I N G S OF FACT S H O U L D N O T B E C O N S I D E R E D

Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of
facts in order to establish that those findings are clearly erroneous. The Utah Supreme
Court has held that, to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal,
[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against
the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.' "
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
When a party fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court " 'assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of
the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case.' " Heber City
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Corp. p. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199
(Utah 1991)). The legal basis for the trial court's decision has been addressed above and will
not be revisited here.
In challenging the acknowledgments of the notaries, Appellant merely recites the
evidence that weighs in her favor while ignoring testimony that supports them. For
example, Patricia Tunson explained that she failed to immediately stamp the Zion
Condominium Deed because she was engaged in a conversation with Rosemary when she
signed the acknowledgment, and then only some time later did she discover she had failed
to stamp it. (R. 486, pp. 6-7) Appellant fails to mention this or cite to the record. More
importandy, Appellant fails to explain how notary Patricia Tunson's procedural errors are
relevant to the issue of forgery.
Appellant further fails to direct the Court to where Ms. Weir's testimony can be
found and offers the bald assertion that discrepancies in her signature go to her credibility.
She does not explain how this relates to credibility or how it is relevant to whether the deeds
were forged. Finally, her statement that "there is no evidence . . . that these documents were
signed by Rosemary Cosby" (see Appellant's Brief at pg. 21) impermissibly shifts the burden
of proof to Defendants.
V,

E V E N ASSUMING T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D I N EXCLUDING
H A N D W R I T I N G E V I D E N C E . T H A T ERROR WAS HARMLESS A N D T H E
TRIAL COURT'S D E C I S I O N S H O U L D B E AFFIRMED

The trial court's exclusion of expert and lay testimony of handwriting recognition
should only be reversed if the exclusion was prejudicial to the substantial rights of a party.
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Berrettv. Denver andRio Grande Western KK Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992).
There, the court held:
[If] the error appears to be of such a nature that it can be said
with assurance that it was of no material consequence in its
effect upon the trial because reasonable minds would have
arrived at the same result, regardless of such error, it would be
harmless and the granting of a new trial would not be
warranted.
Id. (citing Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah 1957)).
Under the facts of this case, no reasonable jury could have found for Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs theory of the case was predicated upon the allegation that fraud and forgery had
occurred in connection with the signing of the challenged deeds. However, because the
deeds were acknowledged, their validity could only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. See Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952).
Clear and convincing evidence has "not only the power to persuade the mind as to the
probable truth or correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of
clinching such truth or correctness." Jardine v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah 1955)
{citing Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204-205 (Utah 1949). Such evidence leaves "no
serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion." Jardine, 279 P.2d at
457.
Given the discrepancy between the primary testimony of the notaries, asserting that
they had acknowledged all the deeds in question pursuant to Rosemary's request, and the
slender secondary handwriting recognition evidence proffered by Plaintiff, no reasonable
jury could have concluded that forgery had occurred without "substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion." See id. Further, the fact that the lay witnesses' handwriting
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recognition testimony would have been by interested parties (the Appellant and Rosemary's
grandson) would have resolved any doubts concerning the authenticity of the signatures in
favor of the notaries. (R. 487, pg. 33) Those witnesses were clearly interested in having the
various properties in question returned to Rosemary's estate so that it could be carved up
between them by representation.
Moreover, the expert witness' testimony, even if admitted, would have been mere
secondary evidence, unlike the testimony of the notaries, who spoke from direct, personal
knowledge. The expert witness testimony thus would not have been entitled to the same
weight as the notaries' testimony.

c

"[T]he testimony of the officer taking the

acknowledgment would be the most persuasive testimony that could be produced upon the
fact [of due acknowledgment].'" See Northcrest, 248 P.2d at 695 {citing Campbell v. Campbell,
146 Wash. 478, 263 P. 957 (Wash. 1928)).
A directed verdict or a j.n.o.v. would have been foregone conclusions if this case had
been tried before a jury. Indeed, the empaneling a jury would have been a meaningless
gesture, and a colossal waste of judicial resources, given the insufficiency of Appellant's
evidence.
CONCLUSION

The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. Utah's Acknowledgment Statute wisely
prohibits acknowledged deeds from being challenged based upon handwriting evidence
alone, unless the notary is not available to testify, or the notary's testimony can be
impeached. Otherwise, any interested person claiming familiarity with a person's signature
could challenge an acknowledged deed and bring her case to a jury without any further
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evidence than her self-interested say-so. Such evidence, however, would never be
substantial enough to fulfill the clear and convincing burden necessary to overcome the
validity of a deed under Utah law.
Apart from handwriting recognition evidence, Plaintiff had no substantial evidence
to support her theories of fraud and civil conspiracy below. Plaintiff had no witnesses who
could provide any direct evidence of conspiracy or forgery. Defendant, on the other hand,
had witnesses who could testify from direct, personal knowledge regarding the
circumstances under which the deeds were acknowledged. Notaries testified at the May 21,
2000, evidentiary hearing that they had acknowledged all the challenged deeds after
discussing them with Rosemary Cosby, and had acknowledged the according to her
instructions. There was no showing that the notaries stood to gain anything from this
testimony, or that they were untruthful. The trial court's ruling should therefore be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f

day of December, 2001.
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
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Tab A

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 10.
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors
by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict.
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial orunnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.

UTAH CODE TITLE 57, CHAPTER 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

§ 57-2-10. Proof of execution-How made
The proof of the execution of any conveyance whereby real estate is conveyed or
may be affected shall be:
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, if there is one; or,
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead, or cannot be had, by evidence of the
handwriting of the party, and of a subscribing witness, if there is one, given by a credible
witness to each signature.
§ 57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified
No proof by a subscribing witness shall be taken unless such witness shall be
personally known to the officer taking the proof to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the conveyance as a witness thereto, or shall be proved to be such by the oath or
affirmation of a credible witness personally known to such officer.
§ 57-2-12. Certificate of proof by subscribing witness
No certificate of such proof shall be made unless such subscribing witness shall
prove that the person whose name is subscribed thereto as a party is the person described
in, and who executed, the same; that such person executed the conveyance, and that such
person subscribed his name thereto as a witness thereof at the request of the maker of such
instrument.

§ 57-2-13. Form for certificate of proof.
The certificate of proof shall be substantially in the following form, to wit:
State of Utah, County of
On this
(month\day\year), before me personally appeared
, personally
known to me (or satisfactorily proved to me by the oath of
, a competent and credible
witness for that purpose, by me duly sworn) to be the same person whose name is
subscribed to the above instrument as a witness thereto, who, being by me duly sworn,
deposed and said that he resides in
, county of
, and state of Utah; that he was
present and saw
, personally known to him to be the signer of the above instrument as
a party thereto, sign and deliver the same, and heard him acknowledge that he executed the

same, and that he, the deponent, thereupon signed his name as a subscribing witness thereto
at the request of said
.

§ 57-2-14. Proof of handwriting
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the subscribing witness or
witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer taking the same shall be satisfied that all the
subscribing witnesses to such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had
to prove the execution thereof.
§ 57-2-15. Evidence required for certificate of proof
No certificate of any such proof shall be made unless a competent and credible
witness shall state on oath or affirmation that he personally knew the person whose name is
subscribed thereto as a party, well knows his signature, stating his means of knowledge, and
believes the name of the party subscribed thereto as a party was subscribed by such person;
nor unless a competent and credible witness shall in like manner state that he personally
knew the person whose name is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness, well knows his
signature, stating his means of knowledge, and believes the name subscribed thereto as a
witness was thereto subscribed by such person.
§ 57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness
Upon the application of any grantee in any conveyance required by law to be
recorded, or of any person claiming under such grantee, verified under the oath of the
applicant, that any witness to such conveyance residing in the county where such application
is made refuses to appear and testify touching the execution thereof, and that such
conveyance cannot be proved without his evidence, any officer a u t h o r e d to take the
acknowledgment or proof of such conveyance may issue a subpoena requiring such witness
to appear before such officer and testify touching the execution thereof.
§ 57-2-17. Disobedience of subpoenaed witness—Contempt—Proof aliunde
Every person who, being served with a subpoena, shall without reasonable cause
refuse or neglect to appear, or appearing, shall refuse to answer upon oath touching the
matters aforesaid, shall be liable to the party injured for such damages as may be sustained
by him on account of such neglect or refusal, and may also be dealt with for contempt as
provided by law; but no person shall be required to attend who resides out of the county in
which the proof is to be taken, nor unless his reasonable expenses shall have first been
tendered to him; provided, that if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the officer so
authorized to take such acknowledgment that such subscribing witness purposely conceals
himself, or keeps out of the way, so that he cannot be served with a subpoena or taken on

attachment after the use of due diligence to that end, or in case of his continued failure or
refusal to testify for the space of one hour after his appearance shall have been compelled by
process, then said conveyance or other instrument may be proved and admitted to record in
the same manner as if such subscribing witness thereto were dead.

UTAH CODE TITLE 46 (2001). NOTARIZATION AND AUTHENTICATION OF
DOCUMENTS AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES. CHAPTER 1. NOTARIES PUBLIC
REFORM ACT.
(1998)
§ 464-2 Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer,
whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory
evidence, has admitted, in the notary's presence, having signed a document voluntarily for
its stated purpose.

(2001)
§ 46-1-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Acknowledgment" means a notarial act in which a notary certifies that a signer,
whose identity is personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory
evidence, has admitted, and which admission is made either in the presence of the notary or
by an electronic communication that is as reliable as an admission made in the presence of
the notary, provided that the electronic communication is authorized by law or rule, signing
a document voluntarily for its stated purpose.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect
to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be
conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so
requests.
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary
matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce
before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.

RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.

RULE 611. M O D E AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION A N D PRESENTATION
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject

matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness1 testimony.
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls
a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party,
interrogation may be by leading questions.

TabB

Summary of the Challenged Deeds and Corresponding Exhibit Numbers for the
May 21, 2001 Hearing
Plaintiff's
Exhibit

Deed/Type

Date of
Signature

1

Zion Condominium
Quit Claim

12/16/96

P. Tunson

329

Rosemary & Robert Cosby, Joint
Tenancy with Rights of Survivorship

4

Park Crest
Quit Claim

08/16/96

L. Weir

331

Rosemary & Robert Cosby, Joint
Tenancy with Rights of Survivorship I

6

Deer Hollow
(Huntsman Plat "A")
Quit Claim

11/02/94

L. Weir

326

Rosemary & Robert Cosby, Tenants in
Common

5

Westpointe
Quit Claim

03/25/94

L. Weir

328

Annie L. Johnson, Fee Simple

7

Coates & Corum's
Quit Claim

11/27/89

Janet Martin

330

Faith Temple Pentecostal Church,
Fee Simple

Zion Condominium
Trust Deed

12/16/96

P. Tunson

340

United Security Financial
(Beneficiary)

08/18/95

Tarci Eastburn

56

Chase Manhattan (Beneficiary)

11/02/94

Tarci Carlson
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United Security Financial
(Beneficiary)

! Deer Hollow
Trust Deed (2nd)
Deer Hollow
Trust Deed

Notary

Record
Page

Grantee(s)/Estate Granted
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